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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                            
 
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
         In this appeal, we must evaluate the Secretary of 
Labor's interpretation of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 ("LLRW Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021a-2021j, 
under the standard set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  We hold 
that the Secretary's interpretation was a permissible reading of 
an ambiguous statute and is properly accorded deference.  We will 
therefore reverse the district court's decision and enter 
judgment for the Secretary.       
                               I. 
         This case revolves around Congress's efforts to address 
the nation's problems with the disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste ("LLRW") and the Secretary of Energy's ("Secretary") 
attempts to implement Congress's legislated solution.  Much of 
the background to this dispute is described in New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional the LLRW Act's requirement that states which 
were not in compliance with the Act after January 1, 1993, take 
title to their waste.  42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(i).  The Court 
held the take-title provision severable; the balance of the Act 
remains in effect. 
         The LLRW saga began in the 1970s when six commercial 
LLRW disposal sites were operating in the United States.  By 
1979, three of the facilities had closed permanently, and the 
states where the three remaining facilities were located had 
announced plans to shut down or to severely limit access to their 
sites.  The nation faced a substantial risk that thousands of 
LLRW generators -- such as hospitals, research institutions, 
universities, manufacturers, industrial facilities, and nuclear 
power plants -- would have nowhere to dispose of their waste.  
New York, 505 U.S. at 149-50. 
         Congress responded to this crisis by passing the Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 
94 Stat. 3347 (1980).  This largely hortatory enactment 
authorized states to form regional compacts that would cooperate 
to plan, construct, and operate new LLRW disposal sites.  The 
1980 Act authorized the regional compacts to exclude waste 
generated outside their regions beginning on January 1, 1986.  As 
that date approached, it became apparent that no new facilities 
had been built.  The nation faced a renewed LLRW crisis, 
accentuated by the fact that those regional compacts containing 
the three existing facilities could now exclude waste from the 
remaining states.  New York, 505 U.S. at 151. 
         Congress reacted by passing new legislation.  The Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2021a-2021j, created a revised set of deadlines and added a 
variety of incentives and penalties to the formerly toothless 
scheme.  The goal of the program remained the construction of new 
disposal sites.  The new system of incentives and penalties was 
designed to spur construction.  The deadlines included a series 
of milestones by which states had to submit plans, issue progress 
reports, and eventually complete licensing applications for new 
LLRW sites.  States could also comply with the statute's 
requirements by forming regional compacts in which one state 
would build the requisite facility and the others would contract 
for waste disposal.  The incentives included an escalating scale 
of surcharges, which states with sites could charge for LLRW 
waste disposal and a rebate system to return a portion of those 
surcharges to states that met the relevant milestones.  States 
that failed to meet the milestones would forfeit these rebates, 
would face higher surcharge rates, and could be barred from 
disposing of their waste at a given facility. 
         The various statutory milestones followed a natural 
progression toward full disposal.  By July 1, 1986, "each non- 
member State" had to manifest an "intent to develop a site for 
the location of a [LLRW] disposal facility within such State."  
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(A).  By January 1, 1988, each non-sited 
region had to identify the state that would contain the LLRW 
facility and develop a detailed siting plan for establishing the 
facility.  Id. § 2021e(e)(1)(B).  By January 1, 1990, each non- 
sited compact region and each non-member state had to furnish a 
complete application for licensing the LLRW facility.  
Alternatively, any state without a facility could provide 
"written certification . . . that such State will be capable of 
providing for, and will provide for, the storage, disposal, or 
management of any [LLRW] waste generated within such State and 
requiring disposal after December 31, 1992 . . .."  Id. § 
2021e(e)(1)(C).  The fourth and final milestone provided for 
reimbursement only if "by January 1, 1993, the State . . . is 
able to provide for the disposal of all [LLRW] generated within 
such State or compact region."  Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv). 
         To comply with the LLRW Act, the states of 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia formed the 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, governed 
by the plaintiff-appellee Appalachian States Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Commission ("Commission").  Congress approved 
this compact on May 19, 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-319, 102 Stat. 471 
(1988).  The record indicates that the Commission met the first 
three statutory milestones. 
         This dispute turns on the fourth milestone.  On 
December 1, 1992, the Commission entered an eighteen-month 
conditional contract with the Southeast Compact to obtain access 
to the disposal facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, one of the 
three sites that had been in existence when the original 1980 Act 
was passed.  The contract was not renewed, and the Commission 
does not have a contract with any other compact region or state 
for the disposal of LLRW.  Nevertheless, this contract was in 
effect on January 1, 1993, the date by which a state had to be 
able to dispose of "all" LLRW to meet the fourth milestone and 
qualify for a rebate. 
         On February 11, 1993, the Commission sent a letter to 
the Department of Energy claiming that it had satisfied the 
requirements of the LLRW Act and was therefore eligible for a 
full 1993 rebate.  On March 21, 1994, the Secretary published her 
interpretation of the statute, clarifying the criteria for the 
1993 rebate.  She explained that a full 1993 rebate would be 
given only to those states that had provided for disposal of all 
their waste for the entire three-year period from January 1, 
1993, until January 1, 1996.  States that only provided for 
disposal for shorter periods would have their rebates reduced 
proportionately.  This interpretation was based on the 
Secretary's reading of the statute as a whole, relying 
particularly on the related provision in § 2021e(d)(2)(C) that 
established the consequences of failing to meet the 1993 
milestone.  On April 22, 1994, the Commission renewed its request 
for a full 1993 rebate.  On September 1, 1994, pursuant to its 
final policy and procedures, the Secretary paid the Commission 
one half of the maximum rebate, plus interest.  This amount was 
based on the Commission's eighteen-month contract, which provided 
for waste disposal for half of the three-year period. 
         The Commission responded by filing suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking a 
writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to pay the full rebate.  
Both sides moved for summary judgment.  Ostensibly applying 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984), the district court held that (1) the statute 
was ambiguous, but that (2) the Secretary had failed to adopt a 
reasonable reading of the LLRW Act.  See Appalachian States Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary, Civ. No. 3:CV-94-1033, 
slip op. at 16 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 1995) (hereinafter District 
Court Op.).  The Secretary appealed. 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1361 
("original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus 
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any 
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to plaintiff").  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                               III. 
         In exercising plenary review over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment, we must apply the standard that the 
district court should have used initially.  Goodman v. Mead 
Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  Accordingly, the central issue before us 
is whether the Secretary's action meets the test set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984).  We conclude that, in interpreting the LLRW 
Act, the Secretary adopted a permissible reading of an ambiguous 
statute.  The district court, by contrast, held the statute 
ambiguous, but then went on to reject the Secretary's 
interpretation.  We will reverse the decision of the district 
court. 
         Where Congress has entrusted a federal agency with the 
administration of a statutory program, judicial review of that 
agency's actions proceeds along well-established principles.  In 
Chevron, the Supreme Court set out the requisite two-step 
inquiry.  The reviewing court must first determine 
         whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
         precise question at issue.  If the intent of 
         Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
         matter, for the court, as well as the agency, 
         must give effect to the unambiguously 
         expressed intent of Congress. 
Id. at 842-43.  If Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise matter at issue, then "the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute."  Id. at 843.  In determining 
whether a ruling is permissible, the court cannot conduct a de 
novo investigation.  Instead, the court must defer to the 
agency's construction "unless it appears from the statute or its 
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that 
Congress would have sanctioned."  Id. at 845 (quoting United 
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)). 
         Analysis therefore begins with the language of the 
statute.  We must determine whether the plain meaning of the 
statute speaks to the precise question at issue, viz. whether the 
Commission's eighteen-month contract for waste disposal satisfies 
§ 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv)'s requirement that a state provide for the 
disposal of "all" its LLRW.  Section 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) reads: 
              (iv) The twenty-five percentum of any 
         amount collected by a State under paragraph 
         (1) for low-level radioactive waste disposed 
         of under this section during the period 
         beginning January 1, 1990 and ending December 
         31, 1992, and transferred to the Secretary 
         under subparagraph (A), shall be paid by the 
         Secretary in accordance with subparagraph 
         (D) if, by January 1, 1993, the State in 
         which such waste originated (or its compact 
         region, where applicable) is able to provide 
         for the disposal of all low-level radioactive 
         waste generated within such State or compact 
         region. 
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) (emphases and footnotes added). 
         The crucial word in this passage is "all."  The 
Commission contends that a contract to dispose of all waste for 
an eighteen-month period meets the plain meaning of the January 
1, 1993, milestone.  The Secretary believes that neither the Act 
itself nor the legislative history directly resolves the issue.  
Nevertheless, based on congressional intent, legislative history, 
and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Secretary interpreted 
the provision as requiring the ability to dispose of all waste 
over a three-year period from January 1, 1993, until January 1, 
1996.  See Surcharge Rebates:  Notice of Response to Comments of 
Draft Policies and Procedures, and Final Policies and Procedures, 
59 Fed. Reg. 15188, 15191 (1994). 
         Chevron dictates that we begin by exploring the plain 
meaning of the Act to see if it speaks directly to this 
disagreement.  In determining plain meaning, we start with the 
text of the provision itself.  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  "Where . . . the statute's language is plain, 'the 
sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its 
terms.'"  United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917)). 
         The district court held that "[t]he explicit language 
of the Act does not support the Secretary's position."  District 
Ct. Op. at 10.  It later added, "[h]owever, we also do not find 
that Congress has expressly spoken in opposition to the 
Secretary's interpretation."  Id. at 11 n.11.  The district court 
also commented that "the pertinent language of the Act could be 
more explicit."  Id.  We interpret these findings as expressing a 
holding that the statutory language is ambiguous.  After our own 
independent inquiry, we agree.  The plain meaning of the Act does 
not speak to the precise question at issue. 
         The first prong of Chevron turns on the text of the 
provision, in this case on the implications of the adjective 
"all."  This term is not defined in § 2021b's list of 
definitions.  Common usage, however, provides a measure of 
insight.  The Random House Dictionary of the English Language(1983), 
offers the following as the first two definitions for the 
term's adjectival form:  "1.  the whole of (used in referring to 
quantity, extent, or duration):  all the cake; all the way; all 
year.  2.  the whole number of (used in referring to individuals 
or particulars, taken collectively):  all men."  Id. at 38.  
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) offers similar 
formulations.  "All.  Means the whole of--used with a singular 
noun or pronoun, and referring to amount, quantity, extent, 
duration, quality, or degree.  The whole number or sum of--used 
collectively, with a plural noun or pronoun expressing an 
aggregate."  Id. at 68. 
         There can be little doubt that these definitions 
capture the sense in which the LLRW Act uses the word, 
particularly in the phrase "all . . . waste."  Waste is a 
singular, collective noun.  The adjective "all" may refer to the 
entirety of that waste whether it be in quantity or in duration. 
         We must determine whether in the LLRW Act the use of 
"all" refers only to quantity or whether it also incorporates 
duration.  The Commission believes that to satisfy its 
obligation, it merely had to be able on January 1, 1993, to 
dispose of all its waste without any requirement of future 
capacity.  The Secretary believes that "all" includes aspects of 
duration, judged by the ability to dispose of waste over a three- 
year period from January 1, 1993, until January 1, 1996.  Given 
the lack of an explicit statutory definition of "all," we believe 
that the plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous. 
         Having found an ambiguity, our next task under Chevronis to 
determine "whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute."  467 U.S. at 843.  We 
stress once again that the reviewing court must not conduct an 
independent inquiry.  "The court need not conclude that the 
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have 
adopted . . ., or even the reading the court would have reached 
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."  
Id. at 843 n.11.  A far more deferential standard is appropriate. 
         As the Supreme Court has described it, the judiciary's 
task in such circumstances is "to defer to [the agency's] view 
unless the legislative history or the purpose and structure of 
the act clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of 
Congress."  Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985).  As we have framed the 
test, we must determine "whether the regulation harmonizes with 
the plain language of the statute, its origin, and purpose.  So 
long as the regulation bears a fair relationship to the language 
of the statute, reflects the views of those who sought its 
enactment, and matches the purpose they articulated, it will 
merit deference."  Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, U.S. 
Dept. of Labor v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (applying Sekula's formulation). 
         We therefore turn to the legislative history and 
purpose of the statute to determine whether they clearly reveal a 
contrary intent.  Quite the opposite, our review of these sources 
indicates that if anything, they support the Secretary's 
interpretation.  Both the history and purpose of the statute 
suggest that "all" includes a durational aspect. 
         As noted in Part I, supra, the LLRW Act was passed to 
address a "nationwide crisis in low-level radioactive waste 
disposal."  S. Rep. No. 199, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985).  The 
central purpose of the LLRW Act was to encourage the development 
of new LLRW disposal facilities.  H.R. Rep. No. 314, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 55 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3002, 3030.  The Act's selection of incentives and penalties was 
"an essential element of any solution to the serious problem now 
facing the States in the unsited regions."  S. Rep. No. 199, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess 4 (1985).  By passing the 1985 Act, Congress 
sought to remedy the difficulties that had rendered the 1980 
legislation ineffective.  By encouraging the development of new 
storage space, Congress sought to avoid yet another LLRW crisis. 
         The goal of encouraging the construction of new 
facilities reveals Congress's desire for a long-term solution.  
This purpose is manifested in the structure of the Act, 
particularly in its series of progressive milestones.  These 
milestones proceeded in graduated fashion, encouraging states to 
move from a basic intent to create a facility, through the 
planning stage, to arrive in 1993 with licensed, operational 
facilities.  Although states could meet the milestones by 
contracting with facilities in other states or with other 
compacts, the incremental structure of the provisions shows a 
clear intent to promote the construction of new facilities.  
Indeed, it is impossible to conclude otherwise, knowing that the 
original 1980 Act was passed due to the inadequacy of existing 
storage facilities and that the revised 1985 Act was passed to 
spur construction through a program of incentives.  It is 
ludicrous to think that Congress envisioned short-term contracts 
with the already existing Barnwell facility as the preferred 
solution to the national LLRW problem. 
         Other provisions of the Act similarly manifest the 
legislature's desire for a long-term solution.  The allowable 
surcharge for disposal was designed to increase steadily, 
doubling from $10 per cubic foot in 1986 and 1987 (the period of 
the first and second milestones) to $20 per cubic foot in 1988 
and 1989 (the period of the third milestone), then doubling again 
to $40 per cubic foot between 1990 and 1992 (the period leading 
up to the final milestone).  42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1).  These 
surcharges could increase by additional multipliers if a state 
had failed to comply with previous milestones.  Id. § 
2021e(e)(2)(A)-(D).  Rebate money that the states received for 
meeting milestones could only be used for specific purposes, such 
as the establishment of LLRW disposal facilities, mitigation of 
LLRW disposal facility effects, regulation of LLRW disposal 
facilities, or the decommissioning of existing LLRW disposal 
facilities.  Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(E).  The entire structure of the 
incentive program was aimed at encouraging the construction of 
new, long-term facilities. 
         Given this statutory scheme, purpose, and legislative 
history, it seems clear that the Secretary's interpretation of 
the term "all" to include a durational aspect "bears a fair 
relationship to the language of the statute, reflects the views 
of those who sought its enactment, and matches the purpose they 
articulated."  Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d at 452.  There is 
certainly no evidence of a "contrary intent on the part of 
Congress."  Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. at 126. 
         Our conclusion is consistent with the specific terms of 
the Secretary's interpretation.  The Act provides that states are 
to receive a surcharge rebate for being able to dispose of "all" 
waste by January 1, 1993, and this rebate has to be awarded 
within thirty days of the milestone's achievement.  42 U.S.C. § 
2021e(e)(1)(F).  The Secretary consequently needed a definite 
standard for applying the final milestone's indefinite 
requirement. 
         On March 31, 1994, the Department of Energy published a 
regulation entitled "Surcharge Rebates:  Notice of Response to 
Comments on Draft Policies and Procedures, and Final Policies and 
Procedures."  59 Fed. Reg. 15188 (1994).  This regulation noted 
that "[t]he Act does not explicitly define the term 'provide for 
the disposal of all' LLRW."  Id. at 15189.  After exploring the 
legislative history and statutory scheme, and after examining the 
text of § 2021e(d)(2)(C), the Secretary concluded that "for 
complete, lump-sum rebate eligibility, the States or their 
compact regions must have provided for disposal capacity for the 
entire 36-month period between January 1, 1993, and January 1, 
1996."  Id. at 15191. 
         To conclude that the Secretary's interpretation is 
permissible, we need look no further than related sections of the 
Act.  While § 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) discusses the payments a state 
earns for successfully meeting the final statutory milestone, the 
very next subparagraph, § 2021e(d)(2)(C), addresses a state's 
failure to meet the January 1, 1993, deadline.  It seems obvious 
that these two sections work together; the rewards are followed 
by the penalties.  The consecutive subparagraphs must be read 
together to create a unified statutory scheme. 
         Section 2021e(d)(2)(C) provides that "[i]f, by January 
1, 1993, a State . . . is unable to provide for the disposal of 
all such waste . . . " that state must pay the surcharge rebate 
that it would have received for compliance to the generators from 
whom the surcharge was collected.  42 U.S.C. § 
2021e(d)(2)(C)(ii).  The details of the repayment of the 
surcharge to waste generators have important implications for 
this dispute. 
         Section 2021e(d)(2)(C)(ii) states that repayments to 
the generators are to be made on a monthly basis with each 
payment equal to one thirty-sixth of the total amount to be 
repaid.  These payments continue "until the State . . . is able 
to provide for the disposal of all such waste . . . or until 
January 1, 1996, whichever is earlier."  Id.  Section 
2021e(d)(2)(C) further provides that any state that achieves the 
ability to dispose of all waste at any time after January 1, 
1993, and prior to January 1, 1996, will receive its lump sum 
rebate, but "[t]hat such payment shall be adjusted to reflect the 
remaining number of months between January 1, 1993 and January 1, 
1996 for which such State . . . provides for the disposal of such 
waste."  Id. at § 2021e(d)(2)(C).  The balance of the amount is 
paid to the generator. 
         Section 2021e(d)(2)(C) thus creates an evaluatory 
window spanning the three years from January 1, 1993, until 
January 1, 1996.  States have the duty to provide for disposal of 
all waste indefinitely, but they are judged based on their 
success during this clearly defined time period.  Under the 
provision, a state that fails to meet the disposal requirement 
receives a rebate proportional to the amount of time during this 
three-year period for which it did successfully meet the 
requirement. 
         The case before us presents a scenario opposite to the 
one described above in which a state first fails to meet the 
requirement and then succeeds.  In the current case, the 
Commission succeeded for the first half of the designated period 
and then failed.  These two situations are symmetrical, and the 
Secretary believed that they should be treated symmetrically.  In 
other words, she concluded that, when §§ 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv) and 
2021e(d)(2)(C) are read together, they establish a three-year 
period of assessment during which a state is tested for its 
ability to provide for disposal of "all" waste.  The state should 
receive a rebate proportional to the duration of the three-year 
period during which it was able to meet the standard. 
         This interpretation meets the second prong of Chevron.  
It provides a method of measuring state compliance that "bears a 
fair relationship to the language of the statute, reflects the 
views of those who sought its enactment, and matches the purpose 
they articulated."  Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d at 452.  Indeed, 
we believe that this interpretation is so well supported as to 
venture beyond the merely permissible.  In our view, the 
Secretary was correct.  A permissible interpretation, however, is 
all that Chevron requires. 
                               IV. 
         Having held the Secretary's interpretation permissible 
under the second prong of Chevron, our inquiry is at an end.  The 
district court, however, came to two further conclusions that 
could provide independent support for its entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the Commission.  We will address them 
briefly. 
         First, the district court held the Secretary's 
interpretation of the Act procedurally invalid, claiming that the 
Secretary failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure 
Act's requirements for notice and comment rule-making, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 533(b) & (c).  This conclusion was incorrect as a matter of 
law.   
         The Secretary's ruling was interpretative, and 
interpretive rules are exempt from notice and comment procedures 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
         Interpretive rules constitute a body of 
         experience and informed judgment to which 
         courts and litigants may properly resort for 
         guidance.  Interpretive rules are not 
         intended to alter legal rights, but to state 
         the agency's view of what existing law 
         requires.  Such rules "merely clarify or 
         explain existing law or regulations." 
Sekula, 39 F.3d at 457 (quoting Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. 
F.E.R.C., 770 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985)).  "If the rule in 
question merely clarifies or explains existing law or 
regulations, it will be deemed interpretive."  Bailey v. 
Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 1989).  A rule is also 
interpretive if the statutory scheme would have been fully 
operative without the regulations and the regulation merely 
published standards to be used in agency adjudication.  American 
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
         These descriptions characterize the Secretary's action 
in the current case.  The LLRW Act imposed the obligation to 
dispose of "all . . . waste."  The Secretary's notice simply 
publicized the standards she intended to use when applying § 
2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv), clarifying her view of what existing law 
required.  In addition, the Secretary had the power to make 
payment determinations in her role as trustee of the escrow 
account pursuant to § 2021e(d)(2)(A).  She would therefore have 
made these decisions even if she had not publicized her standards 
in the Federal Register.  As such, her ruling was interpretive 
and exempt from notice and comment requirements. 
         The district court also held the Secretary's position 
procedurally invalid as an instance of retroactive rulemaking.  
The court reached this conclusion largely because it believed 
that the Secretary's 1994 publication of her interpretation 
promulgated a new rule that could not be applied to a contract 
formed in 1992.  Retroactive rulemaking is presumptively 
impermissible, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
208 (1988); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 
___, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994), but retroactivity concerns are 
irrelevant to this case.  The Secretary's ruling was 
interpretive.  It therefore did not alter existing rights or 
obligations; it merely clarified what those existing rights and 
obligations had always been.  See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936) (explaining that agency 
rule interpreting a statute "is no more retroactive in its 
operation than a judicial determination construing and applying a 
statute to a case in hand").  As a result, her interpretation had 
no prohibited retroactive impact. 
                                V. 
         Congress passed the LLRW Act to address the nation's 
recurring problems with nuclear waste.  Congress sought to 
address the problem through the construction of new disposal 
facilities, spurred by a carefully crafted series of incentives 
and standards.  These standards culminated in a requirement that 
states be able to dispose of "all" waste.  In the seven years it 
had to prepare to meet Congress's 1985 requirements and in the 
twelve years it had to meet the 1980 requirements, the Commission 
failed to develop any options beyond a short-term contract with 
one of the nation's original facilities.  The Secretary evaluated 
the sufficiency of this contract based on a permissible reading 
of the Act and found it wanting.  Under Chevron, this court 
cannot substitute its judgment for the Secretary's.  We will 
therefore reverse the district court's decision and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment for the Secretary. 
